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A commentary on
Experimental evidence for compositional syntax in bird calls
by Suzuki, T. N., Wheatcroft, D., and Griesser, M. (2016). Nat. Commun. 7:10986. doi: 10.1038/
ncomms10986
Suzuki et al. (2016) report a remarkable discovery: the first evidence of a combinatorial syntax
and semantics in non-humans; specifically, Japanese great tits. However, remarkable discoveries
require remarkable evidence. Their data provide impressive support for a compositional syntax.
Yet, evidence for compositionality is not necessarily evidence for one of the hallmarks of human
language and thought: systematicity—a structural equivalence relation over cognitive capacities
(Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). Some versions of compositionality support systematicity and some
do not (Aizawa, 2003; Phillips andWilson, 2010). We surmise that the question remains open as to
whether the version of compositionality that is evident in the bird calls study does indeed support
systematicity. Drawing on a theory of systematicity (Phillips and Wilson, 2010) we derive testable
criteria for systematicity in the context of bird calls. These criteria must be met before claims of
human-like compositional syntax in non-humans could be justified.
Systematicity is a property of (some core aspects of) human language and thought whereby
having the capacity to understand certain expressions or situations implies having the capacity
to understand certain other, structurally related, expressions/situations (Fodor and Pylyshyn,
1988). The archetypal example of systematicity is where one has the capacity to understand
the sentence “John loves Mary” if and only if one has the capacity to understand the
sentence “Mary loves John,” assuming one also understands the constituents John, loves,
and Mary, where the common structural relation between entities John and Mary is love.
Other forms of systematicity follow from the systematic nature of thought, generally. For
example, in reasoning, if one is told that John and Mary went to the store, then one
can infer that John went to the store—P and Q implies P (see Fodor and Pylyshyn,
1988; McLaughlin, 2009). Hence, systematicity is a central property of human language and
thought that warrants investigation in non-humans if the evolutionary story is to be properly
told.
The authors’ claim of a compositional syntax and semantics for Japanese great tits aligns
with some aspects of the classical (symbol systems) notion of compositionality, which is
sometimes called classical compositionality. The experiments revealed that great tits extracted
different meanings for notes and their syntactic compositions: an ABC note means “scan for
danger,” a D note means “approach the caller,” and their syntactic combination ABC-D means
“scan for danger then approach the caller,” whereas the (agrammatical) combination D-ABC
has no meaning. The classical compositionality account says that the meaning of a complex
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utterance is understood from the meanings of the constituent
utterances and the correspondence between syntactic
relationships among those constituents and their semantic
relationships. In the case of great tits, the meaning of bird call
ABC-D (scan, then advance) is understood from the meanings
of the constituent calls ABC (scan) and D (advance) and the
correspondence between their syntactic relationship (ABC
is-followed-by D) and their corresponding semantic relationship
(scanning is-followed-by advancing). Notice, importantly, that
the common structural relation in the bird calls case is not
simply temporal order, as evidenced by the counterexample,
D-ABC. Accordingly, classical compositionality includes typing
(relational role) information that determines the allowable
syntactic constructions, which are supposed to be aligned with
the corresponding semantic structural relations (see below for
further examples). Failure to make this distinction may be seen
as one reason why simple associative/statistical models that are
based on co-occurrence relations among the constituents of
complex capacities (e.g., words in sentences) fail to account for
the complexity and subtlety of human language and thought
(Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Everaert et al., 2015).
The point of departure from the authors’ claim of
compositionality and the notion of classical compositionality
in humans is in regard to systematicity. A demonstration
of systematicity requires evidence that the capacity for two
structurally equivalent abilities is indivisible. For the loves
example, such a demonstration involves evidence that the
capacity to understand “John loves Mary” is equivalent to the
capacity to understand “Mary loves John,” because these two
capacities share the same syntactic/semantic relation, loves. Put
simply, there is no situation of having one capacity, but not
the other. Clearly, however, this form of (symmetric) structural
similarity is meaningless to a great tit in the context of predator
deterrence, presumably because the capacity to understand
D-ABC, i.e., advance before scanning for predators, has severe
consequences for survival. Similar, nonsensical situations arise
in human language. For instance, one can say “John fed hay
(to the horse),” but it makes no sense to say “Hay fed John.”
Systematicity need not be confined to symmetric structures.
Instances of systematicity based on asymmetric structures also
exist, for example, where one has the capacity to understand the
sentence “John fed hay” if one has the capacity to understand
the sentence “Mary fed hay,” assuming that one understands the
constituents John, fed, hay and Mary.
An analogous criterion for great tits can also be derived as
a test for the systematicity of their “linguistic” ability, using
a category theoretic approach to systematicity (Phillips and
Wilson, 2010, 2014). Category theory is a branch of mathematics
for reasoning about systems of entities and their relationships:
a system regarded as a category consists of a collection of
objects, a collection of relations between objects, called arrows,
morphisms, ormaps, and a composition operation that composes
pairs of (compatible) arrows into other arrows. A category
theory approach to modeling a cognitive system is to regard
sets of cognitive states as objects, cognitive processes that
map states to states as arrows, and composition of cognitive
processes as the composition operation. In this way, a category
theory explanation for systematicity says that every cognitive
capacity in a collection of systematically related capacities is
the composition of a universal arrow that is common to
all capacities in that collection and a unique arrow that is
specific to that particular capacity, so one has each and every
capacity if and only if one has the universal arrow and a way
to compose arrows, which includes the universal arrow with
the unique arrows. An advantage of deriving criteria from a
category theory perspective on systematicity, as opposed to
other approaches, is that it isolates just those properties that
are essential (i.e., necessary and sufficient) for systematicity
from those properties that are idiosyncratic to the domain
at hand. In particular, the characterizations of systematicity
introduced above, which were drawn from the original classicists’
perspective, presume peripheral (symbolic) capacities that are
far beyond those of non-humans, whence it is unclear how
systematicity is even testable in non-human cohorts. In contrast,
a categorical, “objects and arrows” perspective generalizes the
notion of compositionality in a way that affords realistic tests of
systematicity in non-humans. A visual/geometric intuition of the
formalism that underlies the example, provided next, is given in
Figure 1.
The authors explain that great tits have a variety of calls
associated with different predators, such as AC-D and BC-
D. Then an instance of systematicity is when a great tit
demonstrates the capacity to understand the ABC-D calls if
and only if it demonstrates the capacity to understand the
structurally-related AC-D or BC-D calls. Because systematicity
is a structural equivalence relation over capacities (McLaughlin,
2009), demonstrating that a bird understands both ABC-D
and AC-D calls is only half of the criteria for systematicity in
this example. One must also demonstrate that there exists a
component process that when absent or disrupted results in
the absence or disruption of both ABC-D and AC-D capacities,
not the exclusive disruption of just one or the other capacity.
Naturally, this criterion for systematicity extends to situations
of having more than two structurally related capacities, e.g.,
ABC-D, AC-D, and BC-D. The case where only one capacity
is disrupted, say ABC-D but not AC-D, is evidence against the
kind of compositionality possessed by humans. The essential
problem to be addressed empirically is that there are two ways to
realize capacities ABC-D and AC-D: (1) via a shared component
process P that realizes constituent capacity D, and (2) via
distinct component processes P1 and P2 that separately realize
constituent capacity D for the capacities ABC-D and AC-D,
respectively. In the first case, disruption of P implies disruption
of both capacities—systematicity. In the second case, disruption
of P1 implies disruption of the ABC-D capacity, but not the
AC-D capacity, since the component process P2 is intact—no
systematicity.
As the authors point out, studies of language-like behavior
in non-humans are important to establish the missing link
in the evolutionary story of human language. Systematicity
is afforded by effective (re)use of cognitive resources, as the
categorical perspective highlights. The potential relationship
between cognitive resource use (cost) and cognitive capacity
to successfully interact with the environment (benefit) leads
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1171
Phillips and Wilson Commentary: Compositional Syntax in Birds
FIGURE 1 | A category theory perspective on compositionality for ABC-D and AC-D bird calls for systematic (A) and nonsystematic (B) cases. Arrow
labels correspond to constituent and compositional capacities. Disruption of the constituent arrow for capacity D for the systematic composition (C) results in
disruption of the capacities ABC-D and AC-D calls (indicated by slashed arrows). Disruption of the constituent arrow for capacity D(P1) for the nonsystematic
composition (D) results in the disruption of capacity ABC-D, but not capacity AC-D.
naturally to important questions regarding the extent that
compositionality is driven by environmental forces vs. genetic
good fortune (Hauser et al., 2002), or some combination of
these. For instance, one can envisage situations where the
lack of variability in the environment places little demand for
a systematic compositional syntax—e.g., small variation in
predator types, whereby each situation is represented without
representing the common structural relations (nonsystematic
compositionality). Alternatively, environments filled with
different types of predators requiring different types of related
responses may drive systematic compositionality. Such situations
would suggest that systematic compositionality is driven by
environmental forces. However, systematicity in the absence of
diverse environmental contingencies suggests fortuitous genetic
endowment, in which case the environment plays a lesser role.
Empirical data that dissociate systematic from nonsystematic
compositionality in other species is evidence of a branch point
in the evolution of human language and thought, a hallmark
of which is the sheer diversity of situations that are within the
capacity of our cognitive system.
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